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KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
MEASURE OF DAMAGES-ACTION AGAINST A TELEGRAPH
COMPANY FOR ITSNEGLIGENT FAILURE TO DELIVER
A TELEGRAPH MESSAGE RESULTING IN
LOSS OF EMPLOYMENT
A recent decision in the Kentucky Court of Appeals raised an
interesting question of damages.' The plaintiff had been employed as
a salesman over a period of four years at a fixed salary under a con-
tract terminable at will of either party. While the plaintiff was on a
permissive leave of absence he was sent a telegram by his employer
relative to his employment. Because of the defendant's negligence in
failing to deliver said telegram to the plaintiff, the latter was dis-
charged from his employment. The trial court gave a judgment for
substantial damages to the plaintiff, but on appeal the plaintiff's dam-
ages were limited to nominal only, on the ground that the measure
of the plaintiff's damages was indefinite and uncertain.
This decision represents the prevailing view in most jurisdictions
in the United States where the same question, involving a similar
state of facts, has arisen. Many of the decisions that support the
proposition as set out in the Ramsay v. Western Union Tel. Co. case
are recent ones,' most of themn having been passed upon since 1900.
Even though the bulk of authority is in support of the decision In the
case at bar, there still can be made some differentiation, on the basis
of the facts, to justify a recovery of substantial damages in that case.
The question of whether or not damages have been proved with
any degree of certainty as required by law is one of considerable
difficulty and the cases wherein similar questions have been decided
are not easily reconciled. In the case of Story Parchment Paper Co.
v. Patterson Parchment Paper Co., 4 the United States Supreme Court
said, "It is true that there was an uncertainty as to the extent of the
damages, but there was none as to the fact of damage, and there is
a clear distinction between the measure of proof necessary to estab-
lish that one has sustained damage and the measure of proof neces-
sary to enable the jury to fix the amount. The rule which precluded
the recovery of uncertain damages applies to such as are not the
"Western Union Tel. Co. v. Ramsay, 261 Ky. 657, 88 S. W. (2nd)
675 (1933).
2 Supra note 1.
a Kerr S. S. Co. v. The Radio Corp. of America, 245 N. Y. 284, 157
N. E. 140 (1927); Postal Tel. Co. v. Bacher, 90 S. W. (2nd) 620 (Tex.)
(1936); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Thompson, 299 S. W. 279 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1927); De Vice v. Western Union Tel. Co., 214 N. Y. S.
555, 127 Misc. Rep. 5 (1926); Merrill v. Western Union Tel. Co., 78
Me. 97, 2 Atl. 847 (1886); Fulkerson v. Western Union Tel. Co., 110
Ark. 184, 161 S. W. 168 (1913); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Caldwell,
133 Ark. 184, 202 S. W. 232 (1918); Kenyon v. Western Union Tel. Co.,
100 Cal. 454, 35 Pac. 75 (1893); Larson v. Postal Tel. & Cable Co.,
100 Iowa 748, 130 N. W. 813 (1911); Mondon v. Western Union Tel. Co.,
96 Ga. 499, 23 S. E. 853 (1895); Baldwin v. Western Union Tel. Co.,
93 Ga. 692, 21 S. E. 212 (1894); Walser v. Western Union Tel. Co.,
114 N. C. 440, 19 S. E. 306 (1894).
S282 'U. S. 555, 61 Sup. Ct. 284, 75 L. Ed. 544 (1931).
STUDENT NOTES
certain result of the wrong, not to those damages which are definitely
attributable to the wrong and only uncertain as to the amount." The
court in the aforementioned case clearly pointed out the distinction
between cases in which the evidence as to the fact of the damage is
uncertain and those in which the fact of damage is definitely estab-
lished. In the instant case, the fact of damage is certain, definite, and
can be proven, but the amount or the extent seems to be clouded with
doubt. This distinction is fundamental and of utmost importance.
Where it clearly appears that a person has suffered damage a more
liberal rule should be applied permitting the court or the jury to de-
termine the amount of the damage than should be applied in weigh-
ing evidence on the question of whether or not the acts complained of
resulted in damage to the party upon whom the burden of proof rests.
In the case of Allison v. Chandler,r which sounded in tort, the
court expressed the following view, "But shall the injured party in
an action in tort which may happen to furnish no element of cer-
tainty be allowed to recover no damages, or mere nominal damages
because he can not show the exact amount with certainty, though
he is ready to show to the satisfaction of a jury that he had suffered
great loss. Certainty, it is true, would be obtained, but it would be
the certainty of injustice.
"Ordinarily juries are permitted to act upon probable and in-
ferential as well as direct and positive proof. When from the nature
of the case the amount of damages cannot be estimated, there should
be no objection to placing before the jury all the facts and circum-
stances of the case having any tendency to show damages, or their
probable amount; so as to enable the jury to make an intelligible and
probable estimate which the nature of the case will permit." The
fact that there is an uncertainty in the manner or means of estimating
the damage is due to the defendant's own wrongful act and in order
to carry out the effect of sound public policy and to foster justice the
defendant should really bear the risk of uncertainty which his tor-
tious act produced. Why should it not be the situation in the case at
bar?
In the case of Fields v. Western Union Tel. Co.,6 the plaintiff, a
salesman, recovered the amount of his commissions he would have
earned during the time he was kept from his employment due to the
negligence of the telegraph company in that it failed to deliver a
message to the plaintiff. The plaintiff recovered the commissions he
probably would have made on the basis of what he had earned in the
past during the same period of the year. The possibility of earning
the commissions is just as indefinite with regard to the future as
is the possibility of retaining employment under a contract terminable
at will of either party; and in either case the only evidence that can
be taken into consideration is that of the established facts of past
employment, past earnings over a similar period of time, or for a
5 11 Mich. 542 (1863).
a 60 Ore. 209, 137 Pac. 200 (1913).
K. L. J.--7
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reasonable time. A jury may be able to estimate or determine the
reasonable expectancy of a continuation of employment upon the con-
sideration of facts already in existence, as for example in the case
herein discussed. The plaintiff's services had a substantial value
especially when employment was scarce. A jury can reach with rea-
sonable certainty, an approximate value of existent employment by
taking into consideration such factors as: length of past employment
in point of time, whether there was a fixed salary, record of the em-
ployee, employer's willingness to re-employ, etc.
The Supreme Court of Michigan has forcefully declared that the
risk of uncertainty should be thrown on the wrongdoer instead of the
injured person.' In the case of McEKibben v. Western Union Tel. Co.,8
the plaintiff was allowed to recover on the basis of the wages he
would have earned from the date of expected employment to the in-
stitution of the suit. As to the fact of proving the damage this case
is no more certain and definite than the principal case, yet recovery
was permitted. The plaintiff in the case of McMillan V. Western Union
Tel. Co.,' was permitted to show but a reasonable probability that his
contract to sell brick would have continued but for the negligent act
of the defendant telegraph company. Why should not the plaintiff
in the case at bar be permitted to show that there was a reason-
able probability that he would have retained his employment but for
the negligent act of the defendant telegraph company? A recent
Montana decision"8 ruled in effect that where a telegram indicates
that it relates to an important business transaction and that delay
will probably cause loss to the addressee, recovery is not limited to
nominal damages. A Tennessee decisionu permitted the plaintiff in
that case to recover substantial damages for prospective professional
services as a physician as a result of the negligent failure of the
telegraph company to deliver a message which contained information
as to the prospective patient.
In conclusion, the plaintiff should be permitted to recover sub-
stantial damages where he has definitely proven the Injury caused
him by the defendant's tort, and the mere fact that he has not proven
the extent of such injury in terms of money should not limit him to
nominal damages only. Therefore, if the plaintiff is permitted to in-
troduce evidence from which a. jury can draw a just and reasonable
inference upon the basis of which they can award him substantial
damages, though it be an approximation of such plaintiff's damages,
justice will have been better served and there will have evolved a
more adequate solution to problems of the same nature as the one in
the case at bar. Louis H. LEvrr.
S'pra note 5.
8114 Ind. 511, 14 N. E. 894 (1887).
960 Pla. 131, 53 So. 332 (1910).
•°Davenport v. Western Union Tel. Co.-lont.-9 Pac. (2nd) 172
(1932).
nWestern Union Tel. Co. v. Green, 153 Tenn. 59, 281 S. W. 778
(1926).
